Thursday, April 28, 2011

On Moral Relativism - Part Two

This is obviously the second post on moral relativism. Please read the first post if you want this to make sense.

Part Two: Moral Relativism leaves us with an unattractive society
Once the traditional argument against moral relativism of logical inconsistency has been lodged the next stage in the regular debate with the moral relativist is to object that if one was to take moral relativism seriously , one would have to affirm that what the Nazi’s did was ‘right for them’. The general thrust of this argument is of course to demonstrate that moral relativism would support a society that is unacceptable and therefore moral relativism is unacceptable. This argument is interesting, not only because of its powerful objection against moral relativism, but also because moral nihilism in this circumstance does not provide an easy alternative. An opponent of moral absolutes must then choose between moral relativism which apparently supports the Nazi’s actions and moral nihilism which refuses to judge the Nazi’s actions.

I have yet to encounter the proponent of moral relativism (even in the academic sphere) who is willing to justify the Nazi’s genocide and, it must be said, yet to see an argument that coherently defends moral relativism whilst regarding the Nazi’s actions as immoral. Before we engage on this issue, however, I think it important to realise that the issue is by no means isolated to the Nazi’s or even to genocide. This objection continues to be an issue for moral relativist today especially regarding ethical and cultural dilemmas such as abortion, female genital mutilation and freedom of speech. In the following paragraphs I shall deal solely with the Nazi example simply because most moral relativists address this issue somewhere and their arguments can be used with minimal fuss. It should not, however, be difficult to apply these arguments to the issues highlighted above. So what arguments are offered by moral relativists who condemn these actions without, apparently, compromising moral relativism?

One defence of the cultural relativist is to maintain that cultural norms or values (what is right and wrong according to the relativist) only apply within the culture’s boundaries. Thus Hitler and the Nazi’s were fairly decent blokes until they invaded Poland and began violating Polish cultural norms. The objection to this point is obvious. What about the attacks against Jews and their property before the invasion of Poland? Were these attacks justified simply because they occurred on German soil within the German culture? Nor is it an adequate defence to claim that the Jews formed a smaller subculture which the Germans were guilty of violating. That argument in a process of reductio ad absurdum would soon be left declaring that each individual forms a self-determining unit to which the doctrine of relativism could be applied. In these circumstances what should happen if two individuals had conflicting values? For example Person A, who is a good Nazi, believes that Person B, who is a Jew, should die for the greater good. Who here would dare to seek an absolute and declare that Person A is wrong in acting on his desire to murder Person B even though Person A believes it ‘right for him’? One would hope almost everyone.

It cannot even be stated that everyone is a self-determining unit in so far as their actions do not conflict with the desires or rights of others. For desires are going to conflict, as seen in the conflicting desires of Persons A and B above. Who or what has the moral legitimacy, according to the relativist, to decide between Person A’s desire to kill Person B and Person B’s desire to live? Nothing can if everyone is a self-determining unit. Does this mean that Person A is right to exercise his desires if he is capable? If the relativist, attempting to escape this conclusion, declares that Person’s A and B have rights one can only ask, what rights and why do we have rights? Furthermore, what has the moral legitimacy to decide between conflicting ‘rights’? Person A believes he has a right to create a better society for all and Person B believes he has a right to life. Who can decide between these conflicting rights, or if these are legitimate rights? Thus this cultural defence of the Nazis seems to lead us only to anarchy and a system where ‘might is right’. Such a resolution justifies the Nazis and this is unacceptable even to moral relativists.

Perhaps the worst argument against the actions of the Nazis from a moral relativist’s standpoint is that “Nazi values were incoherent… Incoherent desires don’t legitimise values, according to relativism.” One is tempted to posit the question; ‘What if incoherent values were right for the Nazis?’ The argument, however, turns into an absurdity as it seems that the author is calling upon the Nazis to be more coherent (if indeed they were incoherent) before he will legitimise their genocide. Well what if the Nazis were more coherent? It must be noted, in fairness to the author, that he does not appear to believe in complete moral relativism. Nonetheless his attempt to reconcile moral relativism with condemnation of Nazi genocide is plainly stupid.

The final argument from a moral relativist’s position to against the Nazi’s regime is as follows; “A relativist is not barred by his theory from adopting moral values and acting on them. His theory only requires that he accept these principals as true-for-him and not simply as true.” Thus we have the example of an American soldier in World War II reasoning that “’For me, Nazi Germany is an immoral corrupt and totally unacceptable form of society’… This soldier is an ethical relativist, but he rightly sees nothing inconsistent between his philosophical position and his acts of war.” This is a better argument than the others yet remains unconvincing especially when the rhetoric is stripped from the sentence. Thus we can imagine a SS soldier saying; ‘For me, these Jewish children are by their nature corrupt and immoral. It is right that I kill them all as soon as the chance arises.’ From the standpoint of an impartial relativist both the American and the SS soldiers are right. In fact the Nazis may even be said to be universally right when their campaign is successful and everyone agrees with them. This surely is unacceptable. This argument as we can see had degenerated into a ‘might is right’ theory where a moral relativist would be just as right in supporting as they would be in opposing the Nazis.

I will say nothing else on this particular subject except the following quote;

“Everything I have said and done is these last years is relativism, by intuition. From the fact that all ideologies are of equal value, that all ideologies are mere fictions, the modern relativist infers that everybody has the right to create for himself his own ideology, and to attempt to enforce it with all the energy of which he is capable. If relativism signifies contempt for fixed categories, and men who claim to be the bearers of an objective immortal truth, then there is nothing more relativistic than fascism.”

—Benito Mussolini, Diuturna (1921)

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