Moral Relativism - Part Three

Part Three: The Argument for Absolutes
One cannot of course mathematically prove the existence of moral absolutes any more than one can mathematically prove the existence of God. There is however one line of argument which I would like to pursue. (NB. This is by no means the only argument for moral absolutes, just the one I have time for.) The argument starts from the use of words such as ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. The relativist believes that such words have the relativistic meaning of ‘right in my society’ etc. According to the relativist, then, people allow society to decide for them matters of right and wrong, good and evil. Let’s hold off discussing whether the view, that society dictates for us what is right and wrong, is well founded. Instead let’s investigate whether an ordinary individual believes that his moral judgements are dictated by society. Or in other words what exactly do people believe in that can arbitrate on matters of righteousness?

Do people perhaps use the constitution or the law? But this surely can’t be. Who in their right mind regards the law as the embodiment of righteousness and justice? At most, the ordinary person will regard the law as something which resembles justice and attempts to become more just with each amendment. We run into the same issue if we try to proclaim our parliament, prime minister, a particular philosopher, parents or a program on TV the arbitrators of what is right or wrong. All of these may approach, or partly imitate what is right or just yet I believe that most of us would hesitate before proclaiming one of these as our moral compass. Even the vague mixture of these authorities labelled ‘society’ does not appeal to most people as the decider of what is morally true. That is of course unless people like the idea of a contradictory, babbling, incoherent horde of voices proclaiming half a dozen judgements at once as their arbiter of what is right and wrong. The vague concept of society deciding what is right and wrong simply does not appeal to many people when they look at what this implies. As we saw in part two societies can proclaim a judgement on a variety of issues which many people regard as wrong today. Take an issue like slavery. We want to say it was wrong to enslave people at any point in time even while we may admit that many of the individuals and the societies in the past believed it was right. So what authority are people referring to when they declare that something is right or wrong?

About 2400 years ago the Greek philosopher Plato struggled with the exact same problem. The intellectual climate of Athens at the time of Plato and Socrates his master was dominated by a group known as the Sophists. The Sophists are known today from Plato’s dialogues as skilled speakers proud of their ability to defend any issue with their rhetoric. This attitude which prized skill in the debate over seeking the truth had unsurprisingly had developed an intellectual culture naturally relativistic and sceptical of the claims of philosophers. With the right training a man could decide exactly as he liked on any moral issue and defend his decision adequately with the skills of a sophist. This of course simplifies the issue, there was more than just relativism in the systems of some Sophists and the relativistic nature of the Greek philosophy before Plato was due to more than just the training of the Sophists. Nonetheless both Socrates and Plato would defend absolutes against the attacks of Sophistic philosophy.

Plato’s argument for absolutes against a relativistic system of thought is found in his theory of ideal forms. Plato points out that in our judgements we extract the essential component from a thing and compare how this same component appears in something else. For example regarding beauty we know of many things we would call beautiful by virtue of all of these things sharing the essential component of being beautiful. This is seperate from an item's subjective qualities; thus one thing may be beautiful by virtue of being thin and delicate, another through its stability and strength. These subjective quatities do not define beauty. Being beautiful is defined by Plato as exemplifying to some degree the absolute ideal of beauty which exists in the spiritual realm. The more beautiful a piece of art is, the more it reflects and is simular to the absolute ideal of beauty. Of course the notion of any absolute ideal applied to beauty has in modern times been challenged until it is considered politically incorrect to consider one piece of art more beautiful than the other; or that beauty can exist anywhere other than the eye of the beholder. I cannot “prove” through intellectual argument that any one item partakes in absolute beauty any more than another item, though this is precisely what Plato would believe. I can, however, point to two different examples of art and ask the reader if the quality of beauty is more absolutely present in one more than the other. Michelangelo’s David and Dejeuner sur l'Herbe by Pablo Picasso. If the reader remains unconvinced that one piece of art can be more beautiful than another I am afraid that our argument, concerning beauty at least, is at an end.

The example of beauty is sadly not as self-evident to a modern audience as it was to the Greeks. Examples of Plato’s theory of forms can, however, are found in areas of ethics or mathematics. Justice to take one instance is not something Plato believes humans invented but rather discovered. All constitutions and laws, Plato believed, partake in justice to some degree. Lawmakers are concerned with making the laws more “just” with each amendment yet the perfect system of law has not and probably will not ever be truly actualised. Justice, Plato believed, is not something we invent but something which exists apart from the flawed laws and constitutions which attempt to replicate it. It is something discovered not created. If the aesthetical and moral examples remain unconvincing this theory also applies to mathematics. Plato points out that mathematical truths do not exist in the physical world. There are no perfect circles, no lines stretching out to infinity. While these do not exist in the physical realm they exist as ideal forms which we can try to actualise in this world. We do not invent the multiplication table but simply discover it. For Plato then, the only explanation for physical objects imperfectly embodying abstract ideals such as beauty and justice was that beauty and justice must exist in some perfect form in a spiritual realm. Neo-Platonists would later reconcile the Greek philosophy with the Christian worldview by identifying this spiritual realm with the mind of God.

An objection to Plato’s argument could suggest that Plato is making far more of aesthetics and morality then these concepts deserve. That Plato is playing with simple inventions of the human mind and mystifying what was always a quirk of our psychology. To answer this objection I ask the reader to consider how they regard art and morality. Are they simply mental constructs on the same level as emotions? Or are they something far more real, definite and absolute? To my mind it would appear obvious that Plato treats both art and morality in a fashion far more congruent to the manner in which I regard them; as realities and commandments to be obeyed not as emotions or feelings which may have to be struggled against. If I believe something is right I feel an obligation to abide by this judgement even if it may conflict with my feelings on the matter. Plato’s opponents are trivialising something which I know to be deeper and more real than they would appear to understand. It is also to be noted that such an objection does not appear to work for the mathematical concepts as absolute forms.

This then is an argument for absolutes and this is what, I believe, people (certainly myself at least) refer to when passing moral judgements. I refer to the absolute ideal of morality which exists apart from this physical realm and our poor attempts to actualise a moral life. It is this authority with which I can have the confidence to apply standards to my life. It goes without saying that people get standards wrong as I might (probably will) get my multiplications tables wrong but it does not follow that an absolute standard does not exist. What does follow, in my opinion at least, is that the person who rejects the existence of an absolutes standard also rejects and convincing authority to apply morality in any situation. Many people will obviously object to what I say. The two most common objections I imagine will be 1) What if you get you objective standard wrong? and 2) What gives you the authority to judge the actions of others by your objective standard? These two objections I will deal with in the next part.

On reflection this part was the hardest off the three so far to write and I am afraid I have made a blunder of my argument. The trouble lies I think because I am dealing with a topic which is far better intuitively understood than through dry arguments. Nonetheless for those interested in Plato’s arguments and seeking a better presentation than the one above Plato’s on work The Republic is a good a place to start as any. For an academic commentary on Plato’s work and those of other early Greek thinkers I would encourage readers to read the first volume of Frederick Copleston’s series A History of Philosophy.